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as that is. Given that, it is essential that Congress also consider the
effects that any marriage penalty relief proposal has on the choice of
filing status, and thus, on the likelihood that joint and several liability
will apply. Only by this consideration can Congress also avoid the
unintended consequences of worsening some aspects of the tax law
while attempting to improve others. Thank you.
PROF. BECK: Thank you very much Professor Christian.
You picked a subject dear to my heart. I have always thought that
both forms of spousal liability are a species of marriage penalty. The
Poe v. Seaborn35 liability which makes wives liable for half their
husband's taxes when they file separately, and the joint and several
liability on the joint return both apply only to married persons. They
are in and of themselves both a form of marriage penalty. It is a
different penalty than the rate penalty, but the liability rules are a
penalty too which is something that I am sure that we will come back
to later. Our next speaker is Bill LaPiana.
MODERN COVERTURE: OLD WINE IN OLD BOTTLES
William P. LaPiana
PROF. LaPIANA:**** Good morning. Any discussion of men,
women, marriage, family and taxation is bound to be contentious
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since it concerns the relationships between men, women, sex, and
money. In addition to these contentious issues, we have to realize that
marriage is not for everyone. Some couples simply do not wish to
marry, and some cannot because the two partners are of the same sex.
These observations seem to be pretty obvious, and probably mean
nothing to those who profess to base their efforts for tax reform in a
fervent belief in the traditional family. Those who are unable or
unwilling to marry, of course, are not faced with the possibility of an
income tax marriage penalty or a marriage bonus or, indeed, need they
be concerned with potential joint and several liability for each other's
taxes. While I know of no reliable information, my guess is that there
is a widely held belief that unmarried couples, whether gay, lesbian or
straight, consist of two earners who are better off not married. That
judgment, however, takes into account only the income tax. The
transfer tax situation of the unmarried couple is disastrous.
The partners may be making taxable gifts to each other every
day of their lives together, gifts which, over time, will completely
erode their unified credits against the transfer tax and have the
potential for completely deranging any estate tax planning in which
they may have engaged.36 For example, if the wealthier partner pays
for vacations, he or she is making gifts to the poorer partner. The
wealthier partner, or in New York, the more fortunate partner, is the
tenant of record or the owner of the couple's residence. If he or she
never collects rent from the other partner, the foregone rent may be a
gift. In the course of a single calendar year these gifts may well
exceed the annual present interest exclusion of $10,000. Husbands
and wives, however, have no worries in this situation, because for
transfer tax purposes, husband and wife are one. When partners are
married inter-spousal transfers are completely free of tax.37 This
36 To the extent gifts exceed the present interest exclusion, see I.R.C. §
2503(b) (1999), or do not fall under another exclusion, see I.R.C. § 2503(b), (c), (e)
(1999), a gift tax is due, although there will be no tax paid until the amount of tax levied
on the cumulative total of lifetime gifts made by the taxpayer exceeds the amount of the
unified credit against the transfer taxes, see I.R.C. § 2010 (1999). An increase in the
credit is currently phasing in. In 2006 the credit will offset the taxes on $1,000,000 of
transfers. Unplanned use of the credit during life will certainly upset any estate plan
based on having the credit available at death.
" See I.R.C. §§ 2056(d)(2), 2523.
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provision of both the estate and gift taxes (the unlimited marital
deduction) is an important factor in formulating a solution to the
problem posed by the income taxation of the married couple. Were
the solution to the income tax problem a separate assessment system
there would, one assumes, be an enormous incentive to transfer
income producing capital to the poorer spouse so that its return would
be taxed to him or her. Therefore, both sets of rate brackets would be
used to maximum advantage, assuming, of course, we maintain a
progressive system and ignore other solutions to the allocation of
income problem. At first glance this might not be such a bad thing,
especially in terms of social policy, if it encourages the true equal
sharing of the couple's wealth; but will it?
First of all, it is possible to transfer the income of property to
the poorer spouse without giving the spouse any control over the
property. A properly structured qualified terminal interest property
(QTIP) trust will pay and tax all income to the spouse/beneficiary,
leave the spouse/beneficiary without any control over the trust
principal, and on the spouse/beneficiary's death, pass the property to
whomever the donor spouse has selected.38 The price, of course, is
taxation of the trust property in the spouse/beneficiary's estate, which
may not be such a bad thing. Forcing taxation in the poorer spouse's
estate may reduce the overall estate taxes for the marital unit by, in
effect, transferring some of the wealthier spouse's estate tax liability
to the poorer spouse.
The QTIP trust, of course, is a statutory device, the existence
of which should make us question the relationship between the
unlimited marital deduction and the idea that marriage is an equal
economic partnership. It takes no great insight to note that the
partnership theory is not without critics. From the progressive
direction, a feminist critique tries to show that marriages are not
marked by true partnership, but rather are governed by socially
dictated roles of dominance and submission, which always leave
women at a disadvantage, placing the burdens on them and giving
relatively more control to men. Marjorie Kornhauser, for example,
paints just this sort of picture of marriage and then outlines a tax
3" See I.R.C. § 2523(n. The corresponding estate tax provision is I.R.C. §
2056(b)(7).
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regime in which women's fundamentally different role would be
recognized. 39 From a traditional direction, we need only consider the
recent statement by the Southern Baptist Convention that women are
to be submissive to their husbands. What these two apparently
disparate approaches have in common is a view of marriage as
something other than a union of equals, something much more
complex than a partnership of market actors. For better or for worse,
marriage is at the center of a social organization marked by male
leadership and law must either reinforce that organization or struggle
against it. In either case, that sort of institution may not be one which
same sex or non-traditional heterosexual couples want to embrace. In
a sense, both of these views hearken back to the old common law
doctrine of coverture in which the wife's legal personality was
submerged into that of the husband. One view sees an economic
version of coverture which the law must try to ameliorate, the other
sees an emotional and spiritual coverture which, presumably, the law
should reinforce.
If marriage really is a relationship in which one partner is
always subordinate to the other, does it make sense to tax the married
couple as other than a single entity? If the solution to the marriage
were a separate assessment system how would "separateness" be
determined? Would it be enough to simply make a "book entry,"
dividing in half the couple's income from whatever source? Or would
the predicate for separate assessment be true separate ownership?
What if the law required outright ownership of capital by a spouse
before income from that capital is taxed to that spouse. What if
income could be "split" only on the basis of a legally enforceable
assignment - each spouse receiving a paycheck for one-half the
wages of each earner? Such suggestions sound radical, and indeed
they are. Their radical nature, in turn, exposes our limited notion of
economic partnership. If many visions of marriage are indeed visions
of subordination, the legal expression of economic partnership is
equally limited. The QTIP trust, for example, requires that a donee
'"partner" receive only limited access to the economic value of the
property "given" to him or her. Although matters may be a little
39 See Marjorie E. Komhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership
Model of Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 1413 (1996).
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